Rust + Wasmtime
Future hardened execution host using WebAssembly/WASI and restricted host interfaces. Not implemented in OSR 0.2.
TECHNOLOGY / ARCHITECTURE
Independent enforcement at the execution boundary.
The OSR target architecture separates execution policy, isolated workloads and trusted resource brokers from application and orchestration interfaces.
Reference architecture
- Applications, APIs, WordPress and autonomous agents submit authenticated execution requests.
- OSR independently validates principal identity, module digest, policy and exact capability scope.
- The proposed hardened host executes restricted WebAssembly workloads with enforceable CPU, memory and deadline limits.
- Filesystem, HTTP, database and external API access pass through trusted brokers with per-resource authorization.
- Audit evidence associates actor, policy, grant, request and outcome without exposing private data or secrets.
- QR-V may independently validate receipts; OMOS may orchestrate requests but neither can override OSR enforcement.
Proposed technology components
Policy engine
Versioned default-deny grants, authenticated actors, expiration and revocation.
Capability brokers
Scoped file operations, destination-restricted HTTP, limited database operations and API access.
Durable evidence
Protected signing keys, signed receipts, persistent records and external integrity checkpoints.
Developer interfaces
Proposed React/TypeScript views for modules, policies, grants, approvals and evidence.
Connectors
Proposed WordPress, Node.js, OMOS/ACC and QR-V integration contracts.
Current implementation distinction
The supplied OSR 0.2 proof of concept uses Node.js/WebAssembly to demonstrate a narrow filesystem capability boundary. The Rust/Wasmtime runtime, hardened arbitrary-code isolation, authenticated distributed services, durable receipt storage and network/database brokers remain proposed until implemented and independently assessed.